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Caught-In or Breaking-Free from the 
Middle Income Trap: 
The Case of Malaysia
Chan-Yuan Wong and Hon-Ngen Fung
Malaysia is among the developing economies that has shown 
relative promise in breaking its middle income trap (MIT). However, 
the lack of sophistication of institutions for industrial upgrade 
and the attainment of productive routines means that many 
local firms remain self-organized and suffer from the absence of 
complementarities. This study seeks to understand Malaysia’s 
position on MIT and compare the country’s current trajectory 
against newly industrialized economies (e.g., South Korea and 
Taiwan). This study focuses on five explorations that depict 
Malaysia’s performance position in achieving developed status: (1) 
income and foreign direct investment, (2) economic structure, (3) 
upgrading, (4) social capital, and (5) education. This study argues 
that the key barriers that prevent Malaysia from exiting MIT stem 
from the lack of effective measures in terms of social capital to 
improve education and institutions. Thus, the development of 
productive routines with instituted inclusive measures to accelerate 
the upgrading process is crucial to break MIT.
Keywords:  Middle income trap, Malaysia, Political economy, 
Social capital, Economic upgrading
JEL Classification: O14, O30, O20, O10
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I. Introduction
The middle income trap (MIT) phenomenon describes a situation 
in which middle income countries successfully emerge from the low 
income bracket but have been unable to break into the bracket of 
advanced countries in terms of income per capita (World Bank 2010; 
Lee 2013). A few studies have argued that the reliance on natural 
resources has reduced investment in disruptive technologies or 
relatively hampered the transition to a successful export-oriented 
industrialized country (Ohno 2013). Previous studies (Thiruchelvam et 
al. 2012; Ohno 2013) have shown that Malaysia has yet to emerge from 
the pack compared with newly industrialized economies (NIEs), such as 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, with regard to 
technology development (number of patents taken as a proxy indicator 
for technology development) against GDP. However, Malaysia has 
shown above average performance against population growth, thereby 
indicating that this country may or may not have the potential to join 
the rest of the NIEs.
Malaysia has shown considerable promise in breaking MIT. Unlike 
many developing economies in Southeast Asia, Malaysia has managed 
to transform many informal economic activities to formal ones. This 
country has witnessed economic growth of approximately 5% for 
decades and low unemployment rate. Moreover, Malaysia oversaw the 
influx of foreign direct investments (FDI) into the country, with a few 
investments related to high-cost infrastructure projects, particularly 
from China as part of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. The gross 
national income increased from USD 8,230 to USD 10,010 between 
2010 and 2017. A few economists were optimistic toward Malaysia’s 
potential to become a high-income economy because of the reduction of 
subsidies, introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST), and enabling 
of a business-friendly environment for expansion (The Sun Daily 2017). 
The Najib Razak administration (3 April 2009 to 10 May 2018) 
managed to achieve a low share of informal economic activities (11.4 
share of informal employment in 2016). In addition, the administration 
exerted a consistent effort to lower fiscal deficit (MIER 2016), thereby 
implying effort to lower the debt ratio (from approximately 54.5% to 
50.8% over GDP between 2015 and 2017). However, a few studies have 
argued that it may be premature to do so given the lagging services 
sector relative to similar middle income countries within the global value 
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chain, lack of diversity in the goods and services exported, and lack of 
continued structural transformation (Flaaen et al. 2013; Hutchinson 
and Das 2016). Although the country has no shortage of blueprints, 
master plans, and economic policies, the impact of such programs has 
not had the desired effect, with Malaysia caught between its inability to 
compete with low-wage economies in the “race to the bottom” and still 
waiting to develop the (innovative) capability to compete with that of 
advanced economies. Such is prevalent in the region as authoritarian 
governments, with a penchant for corruption and rent seeking, manage 
to achieve high growth through interventionist policies (Inter Press 
Services 2018; Rock 2017). 
The lack of sophistication in the arrangement of institutions 
and attainment of productive routines means that the majority of 
firms and sectors remain self-organized and suffer from the lack of 
complementarities. Being caught in this “mediocrity treadmill” has 
led to insufficient social capital to proliferate skills and niches in the 
global technological value chain. The high income inequality has led 
to an outflow of skilled talent that was keen to seek fair remuneration 
and working conditions for their expertise. Malaysia has become a 
consumer and skilled user of technology in establishing manufacturing 
and logistics hubs with the attraction of numerous multi-national 
corporations. However, technological spill-over is lacking partially 
because of the weak upgrading processes for the development of 
innovative capability, particularly with regard to industrial R&D 
investment and upskilling, among others. 
During the Najib administration (prior to 9 May 2018), innovative 
activities were emphasized but with mixed results. Several agencies 
and programs were implemented to improve competitiveness and social 
capital, particularly the following that were placed under the direct 
purview of the prime minister’s office.
•  Pemandu ETP – An entity in targeting potential sectors to create 
economic multipliers. It promotes activities that will create values 
in the targeted sectors and provide support for local entities 
and multinationals that attempt to invest for their long-term 
development. 
•  Pemandu GTP – Entity established to add value and enhance public 
service quality. The services include police force public services 
to reduce crime, measures to fight corruption, and measures to 
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improve quality education and living standards.
•  MaGIC – An entity administrating programs that will advance 
entrepreneurship. It attempts to create an ecosystem that is 
favorable to entrepreneurial activities and startups. 
•  TalentCorp – An intermediary to administrate brain gain program 
and skill matching between supply of education services and 
industrial demand, among others. This entity promotes programs 
and schemes for Malaysians overseas who wish to return and 
develop a career/business in Malaysia.  
Although executed with substantial pomp and circumstance, these 
programs were unable to generate the impact necessary to spark the 
paradigm shift that was envisioned to catapult Malaysia to a high 
income bracket. 
The political will swung extensively with the turn of the election 
season because politicians relied on focusing government resources 
to aid their re-election. Scholars have documented that politicians in 
many developing economies are generally populist/redistributive and 
rarely face strong industrial upgrading pressure (Doner and Schneider 
2016). Malaysia witnessed the first change of political regimes on 9 
May 2018. The new government administration, which was formed by a 
coalition led by current (and former) Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir 
bin Mohamad, Pakatan Harapan (PH), has revised the debt ratio from 
65% to 80% over GDP to account for entities that are unable to service 
their debts and contingent liabilities. 
GST has been reduced to 0% pending the introduction of a Sales and 
Service Tax (SST) on 1 September 2018, which is expected to reduce 
government revenue which may lead to low development expenditure 
moving forward. The implementation of many of the high-cost projects 
that have been approved has been suspended pending review or has 
been shelved entirely. Such projects include portions of the “One Belt, 
One Road,” such as the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) and the Malaysia-
Singapore High Speed Rail (HSR), which a few commentators explained 
could be a reoccurrence of the acquisition of the Hambantota Port 
in Sri Lanka. Many of the agencies and programs, particularly those 
previously mentioned, were dissolved, merged, or relocated to other 
ministries. Investigations into irregularities and possible misconduct 
are also ongoing. The PH government has also been active in revising 
the classification of FDI to introduce additional measures that will favor 
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the creation of high-value jobs and technology transfer. These measures 
could be interpreted as a revival of the “Look East” policy vaunted by 
Mahathir during his previous tenure as prime minister.
Nonetheless, this study argues that as Malaysia looks to heal from 
the political irregularities or cases of misconduct, which is common in 
the majority of developing economies, of the past administration, the 
high income inequality may remain for the time being because of more 
pressing concerns for the government to address. This study seeks 
to understand Malaysia’s position on MIT and compare the country’s 
current trajectory against NIEs. The data presented in this research 
were collected from time series data sourced from the Department 
of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM), World Bank, and various government 
reports. The rationale is to enable this study to analyze trends over a 
long period from trusted sources. This collection of secondary data was 
juxtaposed against current economic policies in the selected economies 
to present a comparative analysis of the case studies. The current study 
collated most recently available data for the longest time series possible 
to identify trends and similarities in the trajectory between various 
economies. 
II. 2.0 Performance Indicators 
Doner and Schneider (2016) reviewed a few defining performance 
indicators attained by NIEs in breaking their MIT. The current study 
seeks to discuss Malaysia’s performance using indicators pertaining to 
the ones highlighted by Doner and Schneider (2016) and other studies. 
These indicators are as follows.
(i)  Income: A developing country needs to leap a threshold of a certain 
income level, although no precise science can determine such an 
income level. On the one hand, a few studies have labeled MIT 
countries as those stuck in middle income between USD 7500 and 
USD 11,500 for over 14 years. On the other hand, a few research 
have labeled MIT countries as simply those that attained an income 
level below 40% in terms of GDP per capita relative to the US for a 
long period (Im and Rosenblatt 2013; Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis 2015). The current study used the benchmark of the latter. 
Other related wealth indicators, such as wage level, FDI, labor cost 
competitiveness, and Gini coefficient of income inequality, will be 
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reviewed.  
(ii)  Economic structure: Pre-mature deindustrialization or deliberately 
(rush) leap to develop servicing sectors may cause an economy 
to face a dilemma. It may see itself unable to compete with low-
wage economies in manufactured exports and has yet to attain 
innovation capabilities to compete in highly value added servicing 
sectors. The servicing sectors attained by MIT countries tend to 
be low-value adding, non-exportable, and with progress often 
accompanied by economic inflation. This study assesses the 
changes in economic structure and provides an overview of the 
emergence of the servicing sectors.    
(iii)  Upgrading: This study will provide an overview of the R&D 
investment and assessment of a highly value-added servicing 
sector, namely, construction. 
(iv)  Institutions (social capital): This study will provide an overview of 
the state commitment in empowering social capital and elucidate 
private sector participation in the national investment-related 
policy. 
(v)  Education: Doner and Schneider (2016) used the PISA score in 
their assessment and argued that “countries where educational 
levels that exceeded the norm for their income levels have some of 
the fastest growing in East Asia and the ones most likely to escape 
the MIT” (Doner and Schneider 2016, p. 614) These countries have 
arguably attained a functional educational system that produce 
enterprising personnel that private sectors (mainly multinationals 
in the early period of industrialization) can hire. The personnel 
would accumulate important, productive, and organizational 
knowledge that are instrumental for spinning-off of new 
businesses and collectively configuring new economic structure. 
This situation is evident in Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong. This study will use the PISA score to assess the 
educational achievement of Malaysia to assess one of the crucial 
pre-conditions in the process of breaking MIT.
III. 3.0. Defining Performance in Breaking MIT
A. Income and FDI
Compared with Malaysia’s closest middle income neighbors in the 
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ASEAN region, the former has performed considerably better, peaking 
close to the 50% mark compared to 20% for Indonesia and 23% for the 
Philippines in 2017 in terms of GDP per capita as percentage of the 
US (PPP) (see Figure 1). Thailand (see Intarakumnerd 2019 for the case 
of Thailand) is noted to be following behind and relatively attained a 
steep learning curve as well. The figure for Malaysia is approximately 
15% behind South Korea, although the gap is narrowing over the past 
five years. Nonetheless, the current study would argue that as the 
wage rate remains distant from advanced countries, such as South 
Korea and Taiwan, Malaysia would struggle to retain talent and may be 
unwittingly caught in the same bracket as that of Thailand and China 
(see Figure 2).
Therefore, we should consider that the distribution of GDP in 
Malaysia as a productive state, such as Penang, has been shown to 
have a GDP per capita of 57%, which is nearing that of South Korea 
(Lee et al. 2019), while many other states, such as Kelantan and Sabah, 
performed substantially behind.  An explanation for this situation is the 
high rate of income inequality, which is represented by the Gini index 
(see Figure 3). The Gini index is higher than the rate for Taiwan and 
South Korea, which had an effect on the migration outflow in Malaysia. 
In 2016 alone, 14.7 million Malaysians were estimated to be working 
overseas (Foo 2011; Wong et al. 2018), 27%, 59.7%, and 13% of which 
were in high-, semi-, and low-skilled labor, respectively. 
In terms of FDI, inflows of investment have been volatile and sensitive 
to global market forces but have increased over time (Figure 4). The 
Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA) has noted that the 
major countries investing in Malaysia include China, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and the US. The share of FDI in the manufacturing sector 
(25.8%) is only half of that of the services sector (50.9%). Such FDI are 
particularly focused on chemicals and chemical products, petroleum 
products, and transportation equipment sector for manufacturing, and 
global establishment (USD 3 billion) and distributive trade (USD 1.5 
billion) for services. FDI flows were noted to be typically by equity and 
investment funds (90.6%) as opposed to debt instruments (9.4%). 
History suggests that FDI may be a two-edged sword with regard 
to economic growth. Although Malaysia attained a relatively higher 
rate of wages compared with its ASEAN neighbors and FDI inflows, 
labor cost competitiveness has seen limited growth in 2016 in selected 
manufacturing sub-sectors (see Table 1). Aside from electrical and 
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electronics, wood and wood products, and textiles, the remaining sub-
sectors observed growth rates of productivity of below 5% (see Table 1). 
Manufacturing generally attained a productivity growth rate (1.4%) that 
is substantially behind than that of labor cost per employee (5%). 
Figure 1
 Per CaPita GDP as % of the Us (PPP) of seleCteD eConomies, 2000–2015 
(soUrCeD from WorlD Bank, Dos)
Figure 2
WaGe rate in seleCteD eConomies (estimateD fiGUre for taiWan in 2017 is 
$3192) (soUrCeD from ilo)
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Thus, despite the promising GDP per capita data, this study argues 
that there remains certain barriers within the Malaysian economy that 
would hinder income growth and the progress of Malaysia out of MIT. 
The rate of income inequality and outflow of Malaysians are seen as 
part of the main factors that prevent Malaysia from maximizing its 
potential in driving productivity. The data point to a concentration of 
value within specific firms or sectors. This condition is endemic to the 
Figure 3
Gini CoeffiCient of the market inCome (soUrCeD from sWiiD)
Figure 4
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Najib Administration where “corporate wealth is ... controlled through 
block shareholdings by a mere seven Government Linked Companies 
(GLICs) under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance (also Prime 
Minister of Malaysia)” (Gomez et al. 2017, p. 3).
B. Economic Structure
Malaysia has focused on the manufacturing sector and natural re-
sources in developing an export-oriented economy since the 1980s and 
successfully made the transition in the late 1990s. During this period, 
exports have remained relatively higher than imports although growth 
has relatively decreased in recent years (see Figure 5). In terms of 
structure, Malaysia has witnessed a reduction in primary commodities 
and an increase in the services sector because the country concentrat-
ed on export-led growth (Figure 6). Thus, the share in exports for re-
Table 1
laBor Cost ComPetitiveness of seleCteD manUfaCtUrinG sUB-seCtors, 2016 
(aDaPteD from nPC 2017)
Growth (%) Productivity




E&E 9.6 4.7 −2.4
Wood and Wood Products 5.3 3.2 −1.9
Textiles 5.1 2.3 −2.6
Wearing Apparels 3.4 7.8 4.3
Transport Equipment 3.2 -5.4 −8.3
Machinery and  Equipment 3.0 2.6 −0.2
Chemicals and Chemical Products 2.8 2.5 −0.2
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 1.7 6.4 4.8
Basic Pharmaceutical 1.7 −0.7 −2.3
Paper and Paper Products 1.5 −1.0 −2.6
Refined Petroleum 1.5 16.8 10.9
Manufacturing 1.4 5.0 3.1
Beverages 0.7 7.5 6.8
Rubber and Plastic Products 0.6 6.4 5.8
Fabricated Metal Products 0.5 6.9 6.4
Basic Metals -1.1 4.7 5.8
Food Products -3.5 9.1 14.3
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source-based manufacturing and electrical and electronic products in-
creased to over 50% between 1980 and 2015. Such a growth highlights 
Malaysia’s departure from an agricultural and mining economy to man-
ufacturing (Figure 7). The ensuing commanding power in productive 
Figure 5
exPorts vs imPorts (malaysia) at CUrrent PriCes (soUrCeD from Dosm)
Figure 6
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activities led Malaysia’s economy to achieve a positive current account 
balance for many years.
At this point, we observed that the share in exports is highly domi-
nated by the manufacturing industry. However, services and construc-
tion lag behind considerably (Figure 8). Although Malaysia has been 
Figure 7
share in exPorts By seCtor (soUrCeD from Dosm)
Figure 8
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keen to develop its servicing industries and aspire to leap from middle 
income to high income economy via producing highly value added ser-
vices, the value added sum from the service and construction industries 
has yet to close the gap to that of manufacturing. Experts point to the 
lack of exports in the services sector as a potential drawback. However, 
given Malaysia’s proximity to Singapore and Hong Kong, this situation 
may be a niche that should be positioned wisely. Moreover, the stalled 
growth of manufacturing activities (20% to 25% since 2010) with the 
increasing share of the servicing sector that evolved without much ad-
vancement in highly value added services raises concerns that Malaysia 
may be deindustrializing prematurely. 
C. Upgrading
Malaysia exerted substantial effort to increase the R&D investment 
for industrial upgrading and productive sectoral development. The 
country has a progressive R&D expenditure ratio in terms of percentage 
of GDP, from 0.79% in 2008 to 1.3% in 2015. Business enterprise 
(BE) was the dominant player in the total R&D investment landscape 
for 2008–2012 (see Figures 9 and 10). However, many SMEs and 
indigenous firms remain unable to compete and develop niches because 
Malaysia has been unable to connect the academic–industry divide 
owing to poor institutional management (Thiruchelvam et al. 2013).
The ratio between BE and higher learning institutions (HLI) (which 
research projects are funded by the government yearly allocation) and 
government research institutions (GRIs) in 2008 is 2.38:1. Given that 
the government was keen to increase R&D investment, particularly 
investment from BE, it raised the allocation for applied research in 
HLI and GRI as it may generate (more) interest from business sector 
to follow the measure in increasing R&D activities. Although the R&D 
investments from HLI and GRI were increased from RM 1791.4 million 
to  RM 7592.47 million in 2014, and RM 7234.80 million in 2015, the 
increase generated minimal impact on R&D from BE. The ratio between 
BE and HLI and GRIs has seen a consistent drop from 2008 and 2014, 
and achieving only 0.84:1 and 1.08:1 for 2014 and 2015, respectively. 
R&D activities from HLI and GRI are believed to be mismatched with 
that of BE. Thus, the increase of R&D from HLI and GRI has produced 
minimal impact on BE interest in R&D investment.        
For servicing sectoral upgrading, we focus on the construction 
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sector because of its relative promise in transitioning into an export-
oriented service sector. The past few years have seen an increase in 
the number of civil engineering projects (infrastructure) as opposed to 
residential and non-residential buildings and special trade activities 
(Figure 12). The highest growth was contributed by civil engineering 
with 12.5%, followed by residential buildings, special trade activities, 
and non-residential buildings at 9.8%, 3.7%, and 2.5%, respectively, in 
the fourth quarter of 2016 (DOS 2017a, p. 3). In terms of total value of 
construction work done in the fourth quarter in 2016, civil engineering 
Figure 9
r&D investment By seCtor soUrCe: mosti (2016 PP. 23–24)
Figure 10
share r&D investment By seCtor soUrCe: mosti (2016 PP. 23–24)
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contributed 35.3%; residential buildings, 29.5%; special trade activities, 
4.6%; and non-residential buildings, 30.6%. Relatively developed 
states in Malaysia attained high value of construction work done. This 
result is evident for the cases of Selangor, Johor, and Kuala Lumpur, 
which attained RM 7.1 million, RM 6.8 million, and RM 6.4 million, 
respectively (DOS 2017a, p. 4). However, underdeveloped states, such as 
Kelantan and Terengganu achieved only RM 0.5 million each. Inequality 
in terms of development between the developed and underdeveloped 
ones is apparent. 
On the one hand, the emergence of civil engineering in the 
construction sector implies that Malaysia is in transition toward 
producing highly value added services. The reason is that civil 
engineering is acknowledged as a sub-sector that requires skilled and 
knowledge workers to perform designing, engineering, and consulting 
tasks. This situation is no longer surprising because of the influx of 
infrastructure projects related to the “One Belt, One Road” Project. 
However, there has been a significant decrease in the value of projects 
undertaken by Malaysian contractors in the global market (see Figure 
11) beginning in 2012. This result can be attributed to the non-
competitiveness of Malaysian firms or Malaysian firms being superseded 
by firms from other countries with strong bilateral ties.
Source: CIDB (2017)
Figure 11
nUmBer anD valUe of ProjeCts UnDertaken By malaysian ContraCtors in 




Source: CIDB (2017) 
Figure 11 
Number and value of projects und rtaken by Malaysian contractors in global market by year of 
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D. Social Capital 
In terms of social capital, Malaysia’s social expenditure has a similar trajectory as Thailand and Japan 
and hovers around the 20% GDP mark. In this case, South Korea has bumped up to 25% as of 2011, 
while Turkey has remained above the 30% mark compared with the selected economies.  
In terms of institutions, Malaysia has been unable to develop the networks, productive routine, and 
social capital to compete with advanced, industrialized countries. A worrying aspect which is not 
covered in this research is the increased living cost, which has driven the need for social expenditure 
and government subsidies for the supply of goods.  
Although Malaysia has implemented sev ral public policies to pro ote science and technology 
activities and attract FDI during the Najib administration, the country has yet to gain substantial impact 
and desirable outcomes. Two major policies are the Economic Transformation Program (ETP) to 
tran form Malaysia’s economy to attaining high income status and Government Transformation 
Program (GTP) to transform public sector to be acknowledged as an efficient entity with high integrity. 
Although these policies are elaborate, with explicit key performance indicators that the public labor 
need to achieve, they produced minimal in advancing wealth in the economy. The eventual low impact 
of the policies is not caused by the quality of the policies but because of the weak response of the 
private sector to these policies (Ohno 2013, p. 229).        
The issue is highly attributable to the trust deficit in the private sector on public entities. Corruption 
has been perceived as one of the main barriers in building healthy business activities in Malaysia. 
Many bus nes  owners regarded corruption as a (indirect) cost (e.g., bribe) that prevents them rom 
expanding and investing long term in Malaysia. Accordingly, Malaysia is ranked 62nd in the 
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D. Social Capital
In terms of social capital, Malaysia’s social expenditure has a similar 
trajectory as Thailand and Japan and hovers around the 20% GDP 
mark. In this case, South Korea has bumped up to 25% as of 2011, 
while Turkey has remained above the 30% mark compared with the 
selected economies. 
In terms of institutions, Malaysia has been unable to develop the 
networks, productive routine, and social capital to compete with 
advanced, industrialized countries. A worrying aspect which is not 
covered in this research is the increased living cost, which has driven 
the need for social expenditure and government subsidies for the supply 
of goods. 
Although Malaysia has implemented several public policies to 
promote science and technology activities and attract FDI during 
the Najib administration, the country has yet to gain substantial 
impact and desirable outcomes. Two major policies are the Economic 
Transformation Program (ETP) to transform Malaysia’s economy to 
attaining high income status and Government Transformation Program 
(GTP) to transform public sector to be acknowledged as an efficient 
entity with high integrity. Although these policies are elaborate, with 
explicit key performance indicators that the public labor need to 
achieve, they produced minimal in advancing wealth in the economy. 
The eventual low impact of the policies is not caused by the quality of 
the policies but because of the weak response of the private sector to 
these policies (Ohno 2013, p. 229).       
The issue is highly attributable to the trust deficit in the private 
sector on public entities. Corruption has been perceived as one of the 
main barriers in building healthy business activities in Malaysia. Many 
business owners regarded corruption as a (indirect) cost (e.g., bribe) that 
prevents them from expanding and investing long term in Malaysia. 
Accordingly, Malaysia is ranked 62nd in the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index 2017 and shares the same level with Cuba 
and Montenegro. Many firms are discouraged to invest for the long 
term, such as R&D activities, in Malaysia because they gradually lose 
confidence in many public institutions. Excessive (and occasionally 
unnecessary) bureaucratic procedures, policy instability, poor work 
ethic of the national labor force, and difficulties of access to supportive 
financing scheme are among the most problematic factors for business 
17Middle incoMe Trap ViewpoinTs
entities to pursue business ventures in Malaysia (Thiruchelvam et al. 
2013, pp. 10–12).
E. Education
Malaysia is one of the few countries that was able to get the majority 
of its children to schools (DOS 2017b; World Bank 2016). The country 
achieved 98.9% of primary school enrolment in 2016 and high 
literacy rate for both males and females between 15 and 24 years old. 
Accordingly, expanding (primary) education during the early economic 
catching-up process is relatively easy because the cost of upgrading is 
low (Doner and Schneider 2016) and local politicians responsible for 
education system can reap political mileage via providing educational 
services to poor masses. However, improving the quality of education 
is difficult because of the high cost of recruiting high-quality teachers 
and having them replace the ineffective ones. Moreover, connecting 
education systems with the demanded skills in the industries requires 
teachers with technical knowledge and curriculum that is coordinated 
with the business world.  
In terms of quality of education, the PISA score indicates that 
Malaysia is behind Thailand, Turkey, and the rest of the NIEs in 
the average score for mathematics (at 15 years of age); on par with 
Indonesia and behind the other selected economies in reading (at 
Figure 12
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15 years of age); and behind all the selected economies apart from 
Indonesia in science (at 15 years of age) (see Table 2). Thus, Malaysia 
has a low performance in terms of the PISA score despite the high 
education-related expenditure. 
On the demand side, the low performance in terms of quality of 
education can be attributed to high income inequality issue that 
Malaysia faced for decades. Although the rich and skilful ones acquired 
their skills on the job and send their children into private education 
entities which providing them a path to foreign education, the poor 
ones with low disposable income are discouraged to invest in quality of 
education for their children as the opportunity cost is high and return 
is uncertain.  
On the supply side, not many business entities in Malaysia are keen 
to collectively push the government to reform and invest in quality of 
education. Many productive firms in Malaysia are foreign multinational 
corporations and have an internal training mechanism to upgrade 
their human capital. Other multinationals performing low value added 
activities are not keen to invest or collectively pushing the upgrading 
of education as they can easily move their operations to other lower 
wages economies the time they find wages level in Malaysia is no longer 
in their favor. Those local business entities are investing in natural 
resource (crude oil), plantation (palm oil) and non-tradable servicing 
(utilities and construction) businesses. They neither need critical 
Table 2
QUality of eDUCation (soUrCeD from Pisa 2012)
Jurisdiction
Average score (Standard Error in parentheses)
Mathematics Reading Science
Japan 536 (3.6) 538 (3.7) 547 (3.6)
South Korea 554 (4.6) 536 (3.9) 538 (3.7)
Turkey 448 (4.8) 475 (4.2) 463 (3.9)
Taiwan 560 (3.3) 523 (3.0) 523 (2.3)
Hong Kong 561 (3.2) 545 (2.8) 555 (2.6)
Indonesia 375 (4.0) 396 (4.2) 382 (3.8)
Malaysia 421 (3.2) 398 (3.3) 420 (3.0)
Singapore 573 (1.3) 542 (1.4) 551 (1.5)
Thailand 427 (3.4) 441 (3.1) 444 (2.9)
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mass of knowledge and skilled workers nor see the need to push the 
government to socialize the cost of upgrading of education.
IV. 4.0 Discussion and Conclusion   
The sentiment among Malaysians is that Malaysia should be 
an advanced country by now if there was good governance among 
policymakers with a focus on building export capability as opposed to 
window dressing macroeconomic statistics. Malaysia’s high expenditure 
on education and research appears to have been misplaced (read 
mismanaged) and is not reflected in indicators measuring education 
performance and industrial impact. The lack of technology transfer is 
a pointed issue because Malaysian firms have insufficient capability 
to develop competitive products and are reliant on imported goods and 
services to drive their business growth. 
A telling critique is that “Malaysia throws cash into middle-income 
trap”- $1.5 billion of handouts to enrich the poor but in terms of 
upgrading competitiveness, “it falls woefully short” (Reuters 2017) which 
concisely summarizes the lack of depth in the confidence of policy 
makers with regard to Malaysia’s position in MIT. 
This study argues that the key barriers to Malaysia exiting MIT 
stems from the lack of effective measures in improving education as 
well as institutions. Despite the emphasis on education in science, 
technology, engineering, and Mathematics (STEM), there should be 
horizontal measures implemented to emphasize on developing solutions 
in improving awareness and knowledge in science and technology. 
The apathy surrounding STEM has led to the stagnation in the 
manufacturing sector and the shift to the services sector. Another 
horizontal issue is institutional reform. Emphasis should be placed on 
developing productive routines with inclusive measures instituted to 
accelerate the upgrading process.
In particular, vertical policy measures, particularly for the 
manufacturing and plantation sectors, should be implemented. In 
manufacturing, there needs to be an elevation of performing clusters 
that have emerged organically without policy support, such as the 
electrical and electronics cluster in Penang, furniture cluster in Muar, 
and rice cluster in Sekinchan, with a few measures to other less notable 
clusters in various locations in Malaysia. The plantation sector can also 
benefit through the promotion of linkages between the few indigenous 
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firms (Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad, Sime Darby, UEM) and 
SMEs to create multiplier effects in upgrading the support services for 
the industry. 
(Received 3 July 2018; Revised 24 December 2018; Accepted 31 
December 2018)
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